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Equine Welfare as a Mainstream Phenomenon
Bernard E. Rollin
The 20th century has witnessed a bewildering array of ethical revolutions, from civil rights to
environmentalism to feminism. Often ignored is the rise of massive societal concern across the world
regarding animal treatment. Regulation of animal research exists in virtually all Western countries,
and reform of “factory farming” is regnant in Europe and rapidly emerging in the United States. In
2012, a series of articles in The New York Times focused welfare attention squarely on the horse
industry. Opponents of concern for animals often dismiss the phenomenon as rooted in emotion
and extremist lack of appreciation of how unrestricted animal use has improved human life. Such a
view ignores the rational ethical basis for elevating legal protection for animals. Author’s address:
Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523; e-mail:
Bernard.rollin@colostate.edu. © 2013 AAEP.
1. Introduction
Businesses and professions must stay in accord with
social ethics or risk losing their autonomy. A major
social ethical issue that has emerged in the past four
decades is the treatment of animals in various areas
of human use. Society’s moral concern has out-
grown the traditional ethic of animal cruelty that
began in biblical times and is encoded in the laws of
all civilized societies. There are five major reasons
for this new social concern, most importantly, the
replacement of husbandry-based agriculture with
industrial agriculture. Other concerns include de-
mographic changes in society, ethics changes in re-
cent history, rise of scholarly literature on ethics
and animals, and media interest. The loss of hus-
bandry to industry has threatened the traditional
fair contract between humans and animals and re-
sulted in significant amounts of animal suffering
arising on four different fronts. Because such suf-
fering is not occasioned by cruelty, a new ethic for
animals was required to express social concerns.
Because ethics proceeds from preexisting ethics
rather than being created ex nihilo (out of nothing),
society has looked to its ethic for humans, appropri-
ately modified, to find moral categories applicable to
animals. This concept of legally encoded rights for
animals has emerged as a plausible vehicle for
reform.
2. Background
Although society has always had an articulated
ethic regarding animal treatment, that ethic has
been very minimalistic, leaving most of the issue of
animal treatment to people’s personal ethic rather
than to the social ethic. Since Biblical times, that
limited social ethic has forbidden deliberate, willful,
sadistic, deviant, purposeless, unnecessary infliction
of pain and suffering on animals, or outrageous ne-
glect, such as not feeding or watering. Beginning
in the early 19th century, this set of prohibitions
was articulated in the anti-cruelty statutes of the
laws in all civilized societies.1 Even in Biblical and
medieval times, however, the social ethic inveighed
against cruelty. The Old Testament injunctions
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against yoking an ox and an ass together to a plow,
or muzzling the ox when it is being used to mill
grain, or seething a calf in its mother’s milk, all
reflect concern with and abhorrence for what the
Rabbinical tradition called tsaar baalei chaiim; the
suffering of living things. In the Middle Ages,
St. Thomas Aquinas, while affirming that, lacking a
soul, animals enjoyed no moral status, nonetheless
strictly forbade cruelty on the grounds that permit-
ting such behavior toward animals would encourage
its spreading to human beings, an insight buttressed
by more than two decades of recent research.2 For
the overwhelming majority of human history, until
some four decades ago, the anti-cruelty ethic served
as the only socially articulated moral principle for
animal treatment.
The past 50 years have witnessed a dazzling
array of social ethical revolutions in Western soci-
ety. Moral movements such as feminism, civil
rights, environmentalism, affirmative action, con-
sumer advocacy, children’s rights, the student move-
ment, anti-war activism, and public rejection of
biotechnology have forever changed the way govern-
ments and public institutions comport themselves.
This is equally true for private enterprise: to be
successful, businesses must be seen as operating
solidly in harmony with changing and emerging so-
cial ethics. For example, it is arguable that morally
based boycotting of South African business was in-
strumental in bringing about the end of apartheid,
and similar boycotting of some farm products in the
United States led to significant improvements in the
living situations of farm workers.
Not only is success tied to accord with social ethics
but, even more fundamentally, freedom and auton-
omy are as well. Every profession—be it medicine,
law, or agriculture—is given freedom by the social
ethic to pursue its aims. In return, society basi-
cally says to professions it does not understand well
enough to regulate, “you regulate yourselves the
way we would regulate yourself if we understood
what you do, which we don’t. But we will know if
you don’t self-regulate properly and then we will
regulate you, despite our lack of understanding.”
For example, some years ago, Congress became con-
cerned about excessive use of antibiotics in animal
feeds and concluded that veterinarians were a major
source of the problem. As a result, Congress was
about to ban extra-label drug use by veterinarians, a
move that would have killed veterinary medicine as
we know it. However, through extensive efforts to
educate legislators, such legislation did not proceed
to law.
One major social ethical concern that has devel-
oped over the past four decades is a significant em-
phasis on the treatment of animals used by society
for various purposes. It is easy to demonstrate
the degree to which these concerns have seized the
public imagination. According to members of both
the US National Cattlemen’s Beef Association and
the National Institutes of Health (the latter being
the source of funding for the majority of biomedical
research in the United States)—both groups not
inclined to exaggerate the influence of animal eth-
ics—by the early 1990s, Congress had been consis-
tently receiving more letters, phone calls, faxes,
e-mails, and personal contacts on animal-related is-
sues than on any other topic.a,b Whereas 30 years
ago one would have found no bills pending in the US
Congress relating to animal welfare, recent years
have witnessed dozens of such bills annually, with
even more proliferating at the state level. The Fed-
eral bills have ranged from attempts to prevent du-
plication in animal research, to saving marine
mammals from becoming victims of tuna fishermen,
to preventing importation of ivory, to curtailing the
parrot trade. Ethical concerns about the welfare of
horses has resulted in passage of the Federal Horse
Protection Act, banning “soring” of Tennessee Walk-
ing Horses, and Federal legislation banning horse
slaughter has been proposed and introduced in the
US Congress several times.
State laws passed in large numbers have increas-
ingly prevented the use of live or dead shelter ani-
mals for biomedical research and training and have
focused on myriad other areas of animal welfare.
Eight states have abolished the steel-jawed leg-hold
trap, as have some 90 countries.3 When Colorado’s
politically appointed Wildlife Commission failed to
act on a recommendation from the Division of Wild-
life to abolish the spring bear hunt (because hunters
were liable to shoot lactating mothers, leaving their
orphaned cubs to die of starvation), the general pub-
lic ended the hunt through a popular referendum.
Seventy percent of Colorado’s population voted for
this as a Constitutional Amendment.4 In Ontario,
the environmental minister stopped a similar hunt
by executive fiat in response to social ethical con-
cern.5 California abolished the hunting of moun-
tain lions, and state fishery management agencies
have been taking a hard look at catch-and-release
programs on humane grounds.6
According to the director of the American Quarter
Horse Association, the number of state bills related
to horse welfare filled a telephone-book–sized vol-
ume in 1998.7 Public sentiment for equine welfare
in California carried a bill through the State Legis-
lature, making the slaughter of horses or shipping of
horses for slaughter a felony in that state. Munic-
ipalities have passed ordinances ranging from the
abolition of rodeos, circuses, and zoos to the protec-
tion of prairie dogs, and, in the case of Cambridge,
Massachusetts (a biomedical Mecca), the strictest
laws in the world regulating research.
Even more dramatic, perhaps, is the worldwide
proliferation of laws to protect laboratory animals.
In the United States, in 1985, for example, two ma-
jor pieces of legislation regulating and constraining
the use and treatment of animals in research (which
I helped draft and defend) were passed by the US
Congress in 1985 despite vigorous opposition from
the powerful biomedical research and medical lob-
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bies. This opposition included well-financed, highly
visible advertisements and media promotions indi-
cating that human health and medical progress
would be harmed by implementation of such legis-
lation. For example, there was a less-than-subtle
film titled “Will I Be All Right, Doctor?” The query
came from a sick child. The response came from a
pediatrician who affirmed, in essence, “You will be [a
sick child] if ‘they’ don’t leave us alone to do as we
wish with animals.” Social concern for laboratory
animals was unmitigated by such threats, and re-
search animal protection laws moved easily through
Congress and were implemented at considerable
cost to taxpayers. When I testified before Congress
on behalf of this law in 1982, a literature search in
the Library of Congress turned up no papers in the
scientific literature on laboratory animal analgesia
and only two on animal analgesia, one of which said
“there ought to be papers.” Now there are more
than 11,000. In 1986, Britain superseded its pio-
neering act of 1876 with new laws aimed at
strengthening public confidence in the welfare of
experimental animals.8 Many other countries have
moved or are moving in a similar direction, despite
the fact that some 90% of laboratory animals are
rats and mice.
Inevitably, agriculture has felt the force of social
concern with animal treatment—indeed, it is argu-
able that contemporary concern in society with the
treatment of farm animals in modern production
systems blazed the trail leading to a new ethic for
animals. As early as 1965, British society took no-
tice of what the public saw as an alarming tendency
to industrialize animal agriculture by chartering
the Brambell Commission, a group of scientists un-
der the leadership of Sir Rogers Brambell, who
affirmed that any agricultural system failing to
meet the needs and natures of animals was morally
unacceptable.9 In 1988, the Swedish Parliament
passed, virtually unopposed, what The New York
Times calls a “Bill of Rights” for farm animals, abol-
ishing in Sweden, in a series of timed steps, the
confinement systems currently dominating North
American agriculture.10 European Union legisla-
tion banning sow stalls in all newly built, rebuilt, or
newly commissioned buildings since 2003 has been
passed, beginning in 2013.11
Although the United States has been a latecomer
to agricultural issues, things have moved rapidly,
with referenda pressed by the Humane Society of
the United States abolishing sow stalls, battery
cages, and veal crates across the United States.
In 2008, the Pew Commission (better known as
the National Commission on Industrial Farm Ani-
mal Production) called for the end of high con-
finement animal agriculture within 10 years, for
reasons of animal welfare, environmental despolia-
tion, human and animal health, and social justice.11
Most dramatically, an agreement between the Hu-
mane Society of the United States and the Colorado
Livestock Association passed jointly sponsored farm
animal welfare law in Colorado in 2008, abolishing
sow stalls and veal crates. The agriculture com-
munity in the United States has been far behind
societal concern, and it is apparent from articles
appearing in The New York Times in 2012 that the
equine community has lagged as well.
Science Versus Ethics
There is one monumental conceptual error that is
omnipresent in the scientific, agricultural, and equine
industries’ discussions of animal welfare, an error of
such magnitude that it trivializes the industry’s re-
sponses to ever-increasing societal concerns about
the treatment of agricultural animals. When one
discusses farm animal welfare with industry groups
or with the American Veterinary Medical Associa-
tion, one finds the same response; animal welfare
is a matter of “sound science.” For example, one
representative of the Pork Producers, testifying be-
fore the Pew Commission, answered that whereas
people in her industry were quite “nervous” about
the Commission, their anxiety would be allayed
were we to base all of our conclusions and recom-
mendations on “sound science.” Hoping to rectify
the error in that comment as well as educate the
numerous industry representatives present, I re-
sponded to her as follows: “Madame, if we on the
Commission were asking the question of how to
raise swine in confinement, science could certainly
answer that question for us. But that is not the
question the Commission, or society, is asking.
What we are asking is, ought we raise swine in
confinement? And to this question, science is not
relevant.” Similarly, discussions about whether
the incidence of exercise-induced pulmonary hem-
orrhage is reduced by pharmaceuticals such as
furosemide12 generate the question of whether
horses that bleed from the lungs after exercise
should be running.
Questions of animal welfare are at least partly
“ought” questions, questions of ethical obligation.
The concept of animal welfare is an ethical concept
to which, once understood, science brings relevant
data. When we ask about an animal’s welfare, or
about a person’s welfare, we are asking about what
we owe the animal and to what extent. A document
called the Council for Agricultural Science and
Technology (CAST) report, first published by US
Agricultural scientists in the early 1980s, discussed
animal welfare and affirmed that the necessary
and sufficient conditions for attributing positive
welfare to an animal were represented by the ani-
mals’ productivity. A productive animal enjoyed
positive welfare; a non-productive animal enjoyed
poor welfare.13 Presumably, for horses, analogous
measures under such a concept would be race times,
numbers of blue ribbons, or high scores on a dres-
sage test.
However, the notion that welfare is somehow tied
to productivity is fraught with many difficulties.
Productivity is an economic notion predicated of a
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whole operation; welfare is predicated of individual
animals. An operation such as caged laying hens
may be quite profitable if the cages are severely
overcrowded, yet the individual hens do not enjoy
good welfare. An equine racing stable may be quite
profitable, but individual animals may be severely
injured in the course of racing or training. Equat-
ing productivity and welfare is, to some significant
extent, legitimate under husbandry conditions, in
which the producer does well if and only if the ani-
mals do well. However, if animals do not naturally
fit in the niche or environment in which they are
kept, or, as in the case of many performance horses,
if they are indiscriminately given performance-
enhancing drugs, pain relievers, and so forth so that
they can run faster or jump higher, concerns about
welfare become paramount.
Ethics and Welfare
Equine welfare is an ethical concept. If the under-
lying rationale for caring for horse is, “What we owe
horses, and to what extent, is simply what it takes to
get them to create profit for people,” this implies
that the horses are well-off if they have only food,
water, and shelter. Increasingly, society is taking
an issue with such a view.
In Great Britain, during the 1970s, the Farm An-
imal Welfare Council (FAWC) affirmed that “The
welfare of an animal includes its physical and men-
tal state and we consider that good animal welfare
implies both fitness and a sense of well-being. Any
animal kept by man must at least be protected from
unnecessary suffering. We believe that an animal’s
welfare, whether on farm, in transit, at market, or at
a place of slaughter, should be considered in terms of
‘Five Freedoms’:14
(1) Freedom from Hunger and Thirst—by ready
access to fresh water and a diet to maintain
full health and vigor.
(2) Freedom from Discomfort—by providing an
appropriate environment including shelter
and a comfortable resting area.
(3) Freedom from Pain, Injury, or Disease—by
prevention or rapid diagnosis and treatment.
(4) Freedom to Express Normal Behavior—by
providing sufficient space, proper facilities,
and company of the animal’s own kind.
(5) Freedom from Fear and Distress—by ensur-
ing conditions and treatment that avoid men-
tal suffering.”
The “correct” notion of man’s moral obligation to
horses cannot be decided by gathering facts or doing
experiments—indeed, which ethical framework one
adopts will in fact determine the shape of science
studying animal welfare. For example, if one holds
the view that a horse is well-off when it is winning
races, the role of welfare science in this case will be
to study what feed, bedding, temperature, medica-
tion, and so forth are most efficient at getting horses
to run the fastest, or which techniques are the best
at repairing injuries: much what veterinary sci-
ence does today. On the other hand, if one takes
the FAWC view of welfare, efficiency will be con-
strained by the need to acknowledge the animal’s
natural behavior and mental state and to ensure
that there is minimal pain, fear, distress, and dis-
comfort. Thus, in a real sense, sound science does
not determine concepts of welfare; rather, concepts
of welfare determine what counts as sound science!
The failure to recognize the inescapable ethical
component in the concept of animal welfare leads
inexorably to those holding different ethical views
talking past each other. Thus, for example, in the
20th century, producers of pregnant mare’s urine
(PMU) largely ignored questions of animal pain,
fear, distress, confinement, truncated mobility, bad
air quality, social isolation, and impoverished envi-
ronment. Animal advocates, on the other hand,
give such factors primacy and were totally unim-
pressed with how efficient or productive the system
may have been and flooded the Internet and news-
papers with articles accusing the PMU industry of
causing great suffering in horses. The PMU in-
dustry ultimately responded to such concerns by
breeding foals who were marketable and by self-
policing.15
The Changing Social Ethic Toward Animals
If the notion of equine welfare is inseparable from
ethical components and peoples’ ethical stances on
obligations to horses differ markedly across a highly
diverse spectrum, an important question for the
equine industry is, “Whose ethic is to predominate
and define, in law or regulation, what counts as
equine welfare?” The answer, of course, is society,
because society makes the laws.
It is of interest to consider the things that have
occurred in society during the last half-century that
led to social disaffection with the venerable ethic of
anti-cruelty and to strengthening of the anti-cruelty
laws, which now make cruelty a felony in over 40
states. In a study commissioned by United States
Department of Agriculture to answer this question,
I distinguished a variety of social and conceptual
reasons16:
(1) Changing demographics and consequent
changes in the paradigm for animals.
Whereas at the turn of the century, more
than half the population was engaged in pro-
ducing food for the rest, today only some 1.5%
of the US public is engaged in production
agriculture.17 One hundred years ago, if
one were to ask a person in the street, urban
or rural, to state the words that come into
their mind when one says “animal,” the an-
swer would doubtless have been “horse,”
“cow,” “food,” “work,” and so forth. Today,
however, for the majority of the population,
the answer is “dog,” “cat,” “pet.” Repeated
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studies show that almost 100% of the pet-
owning population views their animals as
“members of the family”17; many horse own-
ers would agree. Virtually no one in society
views horses merely as an income source.
(2) We have lived through a long period of ethical
soul-searching. For almost 50 years, society
has turned its “ethical searchlight” on hu-
mans traditionally ignored or even oppressed
by the consensus ethic. The same ethical
imperative has focused attention on our
treatment of the non-human world: the envi-
ronment and animals. Many leaders of the
activist animal movement in fact have roots
in earlier movements. As a result, the
society’s views on the use of animals for en-
tertainment have changed drastically. Pre-
viously acceptable activities such as dog-
and cock-fighting have been outlawed; oth-
ers, such as bull-fighting, rodeo, show jump-
ing, and horse racing, are under scrutiny.
(3) The media has discovered that “animals sell
papers.” One cannot channel-surf across
normal television service without being bom-
barded with animal stories, real and fic-
tional. (A New York Times reporter recently
told me that more time on cable TV in New
York City is devoted to animals than to any
other subject.) The New York Times reports
on the racing and show horse industries in
2012 are a poignant example.
(4) Strong and visible arguments have been
advanced in favor of raising the status of
animals by philosophers, scientists, and ce-
lebrities.18–23
(5) Changes in the nature of animal use de-
manded new moral categories beyond the
traditional concept of “cruelty.”
Even though all of the reasons listed above are
relevant, they are nowhere as important as the pre-
cipitous and dramatic changes in animal use that
occurred after World War II. These changes were
(1) huge conceptual changes in the nature of agri-
culture and (2) the rise of significant amounts of
animal research and testing.
For virtually all of human history, animal agricul-
ture was based foursquare in animal husbandry.
Husbandry, derived c. 1300, “management of a house-
hold,” meant taking great pains to put one’s animals
into the best possible environment one could find
to meet their physical and psychological natures
and then augmenting their ability to survive and
thrive by providing them with food during famine,
protection from predation, water during drought,
medical attention, help in birthing, and so on. Thus,
traditional animal use was roughly a fair contract
between humans and animals, with both sides being
better off in virtue of the relationship. So powerful
is the notion of husbandry that when the Psalmist
seeks a metaphor for God’s ideal relationship to
humans, he seizes on the shepherd in the 23rd
Psalm. In husbandry, a producer did well if and
only if the animals did well, so productivity was tied
to welfare. No social ethic was thus needed to en-
sure proper animal treatment; only the anti-cruelty
laws designed to deal with sadists and psychopaths
was needed to augment husbandry. Self-interest
virtually ensured good treatment.
After World War II, this beautiful contract was
broken by humans. Symbolically, at universities,
Departments of Animal Husbandry became Depart-
ments of Animal Science, defined not as care, but as
“the application of industrial methods to the produc-
tion of animals” to increase efficiency and productiv-
ity. If a 19th-century agriculturalist had tried to
put 100,000 egg-laying hens in cages in a building,
they all would have died of disease in a month; today
such systems dominate. The new approach to ani-
mal agriculture was not the result of cruelty, bad
character, or even insensitivity. It developed rather
out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives
that were a product of dramatic significant historical
and social upheavals that occurred after World
War II.
After World War II, agricultural scientists and
government officials became extremely concerned
about supplying the public with cheap and plentiful
food for a variety of reasons. As a result of the Dust
Bowl and the Great Depression, many people in the
United States had soured on farming, and the Amer-
ican consumer was, for the first time in history,
fearful of an insufficient food supply. Urban and
suburban encroachment on agricultural land was
resulting in a diminution of land for food production.
In addition, many farmers had been sent to both
foreign and domestic urban centers during the war,
thereby creating a reluctance to return to rural ar-
eas that lacked excitement; recall the song of the
early 20th century, “How’re You Gonna Keep ’Em
Down on the Farm (After They’ve Seen Paree)?”24
When the above considerations of loss of land and
diminution of agricultural labor was coupled with
the rapid development of a variety of technological
modalities relevant to agriculture during and after
World War II and with the burgeoning belief in
technologically based economics of scale, it was
probably inevitable that animal agriculture would
become subject to industrialization. This was a
major departure from traditional agriculture and a
fundamental change in agricultural core values—
industrial values of efficiency and productivity re-
placed and eclipsed the traditional values of “way
of life” and husbandry. In addition, in the mid-20th
century there arose large-scale use of animals in
research and testing for toxicity. This too was an
unprecedented large-scale use of animals, lacking
the fairness of husbandry agriculture.
These new developments represent a radically
different playing field of animal use from the one
that characterized most of human history; in the
modern world of agriculture and animal research,
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the traditional anti-cruelty ethic became increas-
ingly less applicable: the suffering that animals
experience at human hands today is not generally of
the sort condemned by the anticruelty ethic and
laws. Nevertheless, people realize that biomedical
and other scientific research, toxicological safety
testing, uses of animals in teaching, pharmaceutical
product extraction from animals, racing horses to
earn enough money to justify their cost of care, med-
icating horses so that they can win ribbons or belt
buckles, and so on all produce far more suffering
than does overt cruelty. In horses, this suffering
comes from such things facilitating the spread of
equine disease in crowded stables, trauma from per-
formance activities that overstress the equine mus-
culoskeletal system, and the like; producing pain,
fear, learned helplessness, aggression, and other
states for research; poisoning animals to study tox-
icity; and performing surgery on animals to develop
new operative procedures. Indeed, the discomfort
and suffering that animals used in research experi-
ence by virtue of being housed under conditions that
are convenient for us but inimical to their biological
natures—for example, keeping rodents, which are
nocturnal, burrowing creatures, in polycarbonate
crates under artificial, full-time light—arguably
equal or exceed the suffering produced by invasive
research protocols.
Unintentional Suffering
Farmers, researchers, and horse trainers are often
not intentionally cruel. In fact, they are often mo-
tivated by plausible and decent intentions: to cure
disease, advance knowledge, ensure product safety,
provide cheap and plentiful food, attempt to allow
riders to ride more safely (by tranquilizing perfor-
mance horses), and so forth. Nonetheless, they may
inflict great amounts of suffering on the animals
they use. However, because the traditional ethic of
anti-cruelty and the laws expressing it had no vo-
cabulary for describing unintentional suffering, a
new set of concepts beyond cruelty and kindness was
needed.
Society eventually became aware that new kinds
of suffering were engendered by modern animal use.
Although overseers of animal use (including horses)
could not be categorized as cruel, they were respon-
sible for new types of animal suffering on at least
four fronts:
(1) Production diseases arising from the ways
the animals are housed. For example, liver
abscesses in cattle are a function of certain
animals’ responses to the high-concentrate,
low-roughage diet that characterizes feedlot
production; equine gastric ulcer syndrome
(EGUS) and colic have been associated with
feeding high levels of grain concentrates in
the feed25,26 (these, of course, are not the
only cause of liver abscesses, EGUS, or colic).
Even the stress of stabling/confinement is
considered to play a factor in such dis-
eases. Although a certain percentage of the
animals get sick and sometimes die, the over-
all economic efficiency of feedlots, or the abil-
ity to get calories into horses that expend
large amounts of energy, is maximized by
the provision of such diets. The ideas of a
method of care creating diseases that were
“acceptable” would be anathema to a hus-
bandry agriculturalist.
(2) The huge scale of industrialized agricultural
operations and the small profit margin per
animal militate against the sort of individual
attention that typified much of traditional
agriculture. In traditional dairies 50 years
ago, one could make a living with a herd of 50
cows. Today, one needs literally thou-
sands. In the United States, dairies may
have 10,000 cows.
(3) Another new source of suffering in industri-
alized agriculture results from physical and
psychological deprivation for animals in con-
finement: lack of space, lack of companion-
ship for social animals (such as horses),
inability to move freely, boredom, austerity
of environments, and so on. Because the
animals evolved for adaptation to exten-
sive environments but are now placed in
truncated environments, such deprivation is
inevitable. This was not a problem in tradi-
tional, pastoral agriculture or in horses kept
in pastures.
(4) In confinement systems, workers may not
be “animal smart”; the “intelligence,” such as
it is, is in the mechanized system. Instead
of husbandmen, workers in swine factories
are minimum-wage, often animal-ignorant
labor. Therefore there is often no empathy
with, or concern for, the animals. These
sources of suffering, like the ones in research,
are again not captured by the vocabulary of
cruelty, nor are they proscribed or even ac-
knowledged by the laws based on the anti-
cruelty ethic. Furthermore, they typically
do not arise under traditional agriculture and
its ethic of husbandry.
As a result of its awareness of new kinds of suf-
fering, society was faced with the need for new moral
categories and laws that reflect those categories.
Society became concerned with limiting animal suf-
fering in science, in agriculture, and in entertain-
ment events (including many equestrian activities).
Western society has extended its moral categories
for humans to people who previously were morally
ignored or invisible, for example, women, minori-
ties, the handicapped, children, and citizens of the
Third World. New and viable ethics do not emerge
ex nihilo, thus, a plausible and obvious move is for
society to continue in its tendency and attempt to
extend the moral machinery it has developed for
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dealing with people, appropriately modified to ani-
mals. This is precisely what has occurred. Society
has taken elements of the moral categories it uses
for assessing the treatment of people and is in the
process of modifying these concepts to make them
appropriate (or, in the eyes of some, inappropriate)
for dealing with new issues in the treatment of an-
imals, especially their use in science, entertainment,
and confinement agriculture.
Extending Ethics to Animals
What aspect of our ethic for people is being so ex-
tended? One—quite directly applicable to animal
use—is the fundamental problem of weighing the
interests of the individual against those of the gen-
eral welfare. Different societies have provided dif-
ferent answers to this problem. For example,
totalitarian societies opt to devote little concern to
the individual, favoring instead the state or what-
ever their version of the general welfare may be.
At the other extreme, anarchical groups such as
communes give primacy to the individual and very
little concern to the group; hence they tend to enjoy
only transient existence. In Western society, how-
ever, there are usually attempts to strike a balance.
Although most of society’s decisions are made to
the benefit of the general welfare, fences are built
around individuals to protect their fundamental in-
terests from being sacrificed to the majority. Thus,
we protect individuals from being silenced even if
the majority disapproves of what they say; we pro-
tect individuals from having their property seized
without recompense even if such seizure benefits the
general welfare; we protect individuals from torture
even if they have planted a bomb in an elementary
school and refuse to divulge its location. We pro-
tect those interests of the individual that we con-
sider essential to being human, to human nature,
from being submerged, even by the common good.
Those moral/legal fences that so protect the individ-
ual human are called rights and are based on plau-
sible assumptions regarding what is essential to
being human.
It is this notion to which society in general is
looking to generate the new moral notions necessary
to talk about the treatment of animals in today’s
world, in which cruelty is not the major problem but
where such laudable, general human welfare goals
as efficiency, productivity, knowledge, medical prog-
ress, and product safety are responsible for the vast
majority of animal suffering. People in society are
seeking to “build fences” around animals to protect
the animals and their interests and natures from
being totally submerged for the sake of the general
welfare, and are trying to accomplish this goal by
going to the Legislature. In husbandry, this oc-
curred automatically; in industrialized agriculture,
in which it is no longer automatic, people wish to see
it legislated.
It is necessary to stress certain things that this
ethic, in its mainstream version, is not and does not
attempt to be. As a mainstream movement, it does
not try to give human rights to animals. Because
animals do not have the same natures and interests
flowing from these natures as humans do, human
rights do not fit animals. Animals do not have ba-
sic natures that demand speech, religion, or prop-
erty; thus, according them, these rights would be
absurd. On the other hand, animals have natures
of their own and interests that flow from these na-
tures, and the thwarting of these interests matters
to animals as much as the thwarting of speech mat-
ters to humans. The agenda is not, for mainstream
society, giving animals the same rights as those of
people. It is rather preserving the common-sense
insight that, “Fish got to swim, birds got to fly,”27
and suffer if they don’t. This new ethic is conser-
vative, not radical, harking back to the animal use
that necessitated and thus entailed respect for the
animals’ natures. It is based on the insight that
what we do to animals matters to them, just as what
we do to humans matters to them, and that conse-
quently we should respect that mattering in our
treatment of use of animals as we do in our treat-
ment and use of humans.
Importantly, because respect for animal nature is
no longer automatic as it was in traditional hus-
bandry agriculture, society is demanding that it be
encoded in law. In 2004, no fewer than 2,100 bills
pertaining to animal welfare were proposed in US
state legislatures. More than 90 law schools now
teach animal law. With regard to animal agricul-
ture, the pastoral images of animals grazing on pas-
ture and moving freely are iconic. As the 23rd
Psalm indicates, people who consume animals wish
to see the animals live decent lives, not lives of pain,
distress, and frustration.
It is in part to try to avoid society’s gaze that
industrial agriculture, as well as certain equestrian
industries, attempt to conceal the reality of its prac-
tices from a naïve public; witness Perdue’s adver-
tisements about raising “happy chickens,” or the
California “happy cow” ads. As ordinary people
discover the truth about the conditions under which
animals are raised or trained, they may be shocked.
When I served on the Pew Commission and other
commissioners had their first view of sow stalls,
many were in tears and all were outraged; an ABC
News video on the abuse meted out to Tennessee
Walking horses sparked a national outcry.28
3. Conclusions
Just as our use of people is constrained by respect
for the basic elements of human nature, people wish
to see a similar notion applied to animals. Ani-
mals, too, have natures, what I call telos, following
Aristotle—the “pigness of the pig,” the “cowness of a
cow.” Pigs are “designed” to move about on soft
loam, not to be in gestation crates. If this no longer
occurs naturally, as it did in husbandry, people wish
to see it legislated. This is the mainstream sense of
“animal rights.”
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As property, strictly speaking, animals cannot
have legal rights. But a functional equivalent to
rights can be achieved by limiting human property
rights. When I and others drafted the US Federal
laws for laboratory animals, we did not deny that
research animals were the property of researchers.
We merely placed limits on their use of their prop-
erty. I may own my car, but that does not mean I
can drive it on the sidewalk or at any speed I choose.
Similarly, our law states that if one hurts an ani-
mal in research, one must control pain and distress.
Thus, research animals can be said to have the right
to have their pain controlled. In the case of farm
animals, people wish to see their basic needs and
nature, teloi, respected in the systems that they are
raised. Because this no longer occurs naturally as
it did in husbandry, it must be imposed by legisla-
tion or regulation.
A Gallup poll conducted in 2003 shows that 75% of
the public wants legislated guarantees of farm ani-
mal welfare.29 This is what I call “animal rights as
a mainstream phenomenon.” Legal codification of
rules of animal care respecting animal telos is thus
the form animal welfare takes when husbandry has
been abandoned. Thus, in today’s world, the ethi-
cal component of animal welfare prescribes that the
way we raise and use animals must embody respect
and provision for their psychological needs and na-
tures. It is therefore essential that those systems
that cause animal suffering by violating animals’
natures be phased out and replaced with systems
that respect their natures.
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